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ABSTRACT
The central argument of this Article is that conflict over the
judicial practice to use foreign authority leads to the manufacture
of foreign law into a dangerous stranger. Drawing on philosopher
and sociologist Georg Simmel’s conceptualization of the stranger
as a cultural object that sits on the border of the insider and
outsider, I argue that there is a resistance to the use of foreign law
in the United States. Foreign laws, like immigrants in the United
States, are being constructed as tolerable illegals or threatening
legals.
I perform an empirical qualitative content analysis of the senate
confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees and their
discussions of the practice of judicial citation of foreign law. The
hearings of nominees Alito, Kagan, O’Connor, Roberts, and
Sotomayor are studied. During these hearings, conservatives label
foreign law as biased and dangerous. Most interestingly, however,
are the ways in which foreign law emerges from these debates
linked to otherness—particularly the otherness of disadvantaged
gender and racial minorities.
The Article connects the
transformation of foreign law into a stranger to other conservative
movements that have constructed foreign national immigrants as
illegal strangers who should be feared. This work argues that
foreign laws and decisions constitute a new American stranger.
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Resistance is futile.
—The Borg1
1.

INTRODUCTION

US courts have long relied on authorities from outside the US
when rendering opinions. At the very beginning of the 19th
century, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote several well-known
opinions—including The Antelope2—that cited to foreign
precedent.3 Concurring and dissenting opinions in the famous
1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sandford4 made significant reference to
foreign law. Legal scholars have provided detailed evidence that
the judiciary’s practice of citing foreign and international legal
precedents has been taking place since the founding of the United
States and has continued into the 21st century.5 In addition, there

1 The Borg are a fictional alien race from the popular television science fiction
universe of Star Trek. They are a collective of cybernetic organisms, which when
they come into contact with other species, forcefully assimilate them and thereby
add the “biological and technological distinctiveness” of the other species to their
own. The quote “Resistance is futile,” is sent as an audio message when the Borg
targets a species and announces its plan for assimilation. The Borg’s continued
attempts to assimilate Earth and the humanoids that comprise the Federation are
unsuccessful. The story illustrates that when faced with conflict, and odds in
favor of failure, human resistance need not be futile. In fact, it can be productive.
This Article attempts to illustrate that conflict and resistance—by both
conservatives and progressive politicians—has productive and transformative
effects with respect to how society understands the judicial citation to foreign and
international laws.
2 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). The Antelope was a ship seized off the coast of
Florida illegally importing slaves to the United States. The Court ruled that
federal slavery laws did require forfeiture of the foreign-owned slaves and that
the slaves should be returned to their owners.
3 Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 763–80 (2005). John Marshall was the
fourth and longest serving chief justice in the history of the Supreme Court of the
United States, from the years 1801–1835.
4 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The Dred Scott decision ruled that Dred Scott,
a person of African descent, was not a citizen, and neither were any individuals of
African descent intended to be citizens under the U.S. Constitution. As a result,
Dred Scott did not have standing to sue in court.
5 Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 3. See also David Zaring, The Use of Foreign
Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297
(2006) (examining how federal courts have used foreign legal authorities between
1945 and 2005).
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isn’t a significant record of resistance to courts using foreign law
prior to the 21st century.6
Yet despite two centuries of undisturbed practice, citing foreign
authority became a controversial activity—practically overnight—
when the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Lawrence v. Texas.7
The decision overturned state anti-sodomy statutes, and in its
reasoning, cited decisions from the European Court of Human
Rights.8 The debate over the use of foreign law began in the Court
largely in the form of critiques lodged by Justice Scalia in dissent to
the Lawrence majority.9 The press characterized the foreign citation
in Lawrence as new, with one particular journalist mistakenly
writing, “Never before had the Supreme Court’s majority cited a
foreign legal precedent in such a big case.”10 Chief Justice
Rehnquist actually cited foreign judicial opinions in two important
civil rights due process cases. These citations appear in the Court’s
majority opinion in the assisted suicide case of Washington v.
Glucksberg,11 and in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey12 decision on the
6 But see Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 3, at 781–85 (highlighting a debate
between the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153 (1820), where Justice Livingston took issue with the majority’s use of
foreign law and its references to foreign authors).
7 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8 Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)).
9 Id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One might argue that Lawrence is not
the beginning of the resistance to the citation of foreign law and point to Justice
Stevens’ majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 (2002), where
in footnote 21, he referenced the world community’s disapproval of the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders. Chief Justice Rehnquist rebuked the majority decision in dissent,
writing that foreign law was irrelevant. Id. at 322. At the time, however, this
issue did not draw much public attention. Therefore, I agree with Calabresi &
Zimdahl that the normative contestation over judicial foreign law citation began
with Lawrence, supra note 3, at 748.
10 Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Citing More Foreign Cases, USA TODAY (July 7,
2003, 9:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-07-07foreign-usat_x.htm.
11 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In Glucksberg, Chief Justice
Rehnquist highlighted that there were other countries “embroiled” in a similar
debate on euthanasia and relied on two foreign opinions. Id. at 718 n.16. The first
case he cited was Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
Rehnquist noted that in Rodriguez, the Canadian court refused to state that the
Charter of Freedom established a right to assisted suicide. The second case that
Rehnquist cited was Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 20,
1997, M.P: Carlos Gaviria Diaz, Sentencia C-239/97 (Colom.), where the Corte
Constitucional Colombia (Colombian Constitutional Court) decided to accept
euthanasia.
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right to reproductive choice. Even after Lawrence, the press
documented the contentious nature of federal court citation to
foreign law.13
The contestation over the use of foreign law took on a number
of forms. For example, the justices aired their views concerning
foreign law in public debates between the justices,14 and public
speeches given by the justices.15 A vigorous debate over the proper
role of foreign law began in the legal academy.16 Some federal
legislators have attempted (and continue to attempt) to regulate
foreign citations by questioning Supreme Court nominees during
the confirmation hearings on the propriety of using foreign law.
Resistance to the judiciary’s use of foreign law has taken the form
of states banning (or considering banning) the use of foreign,

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for
Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER (Sep. 12, 2005),
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/09/12/050912fa_fact;
Tim
Wu,
Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries Think?, SLATE
(Apr. 9, 2004, 5:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2098559/.
14 Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, Discussion of the
Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions at American University
Washington
College
of
Law
(Jan.
13,
2005),
available
at
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BD
C2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocume
nt.
15 See, e.g., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address at the International
Academy of Comparative Law at American University: A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication (July 30, 2010), in 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 927 (2011)
(expressing her view as to how foreign legal materials contribute to American
constitutional development); Justice Stephen Breyer, Address at the American
Society of International Law: The Supreme Court and the New International Law
(Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/
viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_04-04-03.html) (quoting Justice Ginsburg in
expressing a firm opinion that “’[w]e are the losers if we neglect what others can
tell us about endeavors . . . in our world’”).
16 See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre, Aristotle, Cicero and Cardozo: A
Perspective on External Law, Address at the Albany Law Review Symposium:
“Outsourcing Authority?” Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic
Jurisprudence (Feb. 10, 2006), in 69 ALB. L. REV. 645 (2006) (discussing the recent
revival of the historical debate over the role of foreign law in domestic judicial
decisions); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005) (outlining the benefits and risks of
American courts considering foreign and international law when ruling on
domestic issues).
12
13
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international, and/or Sharia law in state courts.17
Similar
contemplative banning measures have taken place at the federal
level.18
Representative Sandy Adams, a Republican member of the
House representing the state of Florida, introduced a bill “to
prevent the misuse of foreign law in Federal courts,” which, if
enacted, would place limitations on the use of foreign law in
federal courts.19 The bill states:
In any court created by or under article III of the
Constitution of the United States, no justice, judge, or other
judicial official shall decide any issue in a case before that
court in whole or in part on the authority of foreign law,
except to the extent the Constitution or an Act of Congress
requires the consideration of that foreign law.20
Shortly after introducing the bill, Adams wrote in an op-ed that
[t]he imposition of foreign precedent into our federal court
system is a real threat to our Constitution and could
fundamentally break down the very system put in place by
our forefathers more than 200 years ago. Each case that
17 On Nov. 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved State Question 755, amending
the Oklahoma state constitution and forbidding the state courts from considering
or using international law or Sharia Law. See MARTHA F. DAVIS & JOHANNA KALB,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, ISSUE BRIEF: OKLAHOMA STATE QUESTION 755 AND
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-INTERNATIONAL LAW INITIATIVES (2011) (analyzing antiinternational law initiatives); Donna Leinwand, More States Enter Debate on Sharia
Law,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
9,
2010,
10:29
AM),
http://
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-12-09-shariaban09_ST_
N.htm (highlighting the debate on the application of sharia law in different
states). See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010) (banning the use of foreign
law when “[its] application . . . will result in the violation of a right guaranteed by
the constitution of [Louisiana] or of the United States”).
18 See, e.g., John Cornyn, Domestic, Not Foreign: Our Laws Should be Judged by
our Laws, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 28, 2005, 7:34 AM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/articles/214011/domestic-not-foreign/john-cornyn.
Both
legislative houses have introduced legislation in order to prevent the judiciary
from using foreign law. On March 20, 2005, Senator John Cornyn introduced
Senate Resolution 92 stating that American courts should not be influenced by
decisions in foreign courts. S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005). See also Appropriate Role
of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. Res. 568
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2004) (discussing the appropriateness of citing foreign authorities in American
case law).
19 H. R. 973, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 Id.
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cites foreign law is another opportunity to set precedent
and for the Constitution to be challenged and overrun.21
Adams does not see the use of foreign law merely as different, or
problematic. Instead, Adams characterizes it as hostile to U.S.
tradition and capable of harming society. Foreign law, for Adams,
is dangerous.
Given the existence of these multiple normative battles, I argue
that we are witnessing the social transformation of foreign law (a
longtime, historically noncontentious concept) into a stranger—
specifically a dangerous stranger. Upon cursory glance and given
a general definition of strangeness, it might be easy for a consensus
of society to think about foreign law as strange. When a person or
object is foreign, it by definition lacks autochthonism. But
foreignness and strangeness are not necessarily synonymous.
This Article assumes that there is nothing natural about the
existence of strangers, and that their presence is manufactured by
individuals and groups interacting in society. I argue that in
resisting judicial reference to the citation of foreign authorities,
conservative politicians and social movement organizations have
worked to construct foreign law as a dangerous social stranger.22
My goal is to understand normative arguments against the use of
foreign law—arguments that never existed prior to the 21st
century. I hope to achieve this by analyzing these arguments using
the sociological theories of the stranger.
My argument is that the very nature of the debate is based on
socially constructed categories that have no resonance in history or
historical reference. I believe that the foundation and framework
that house the normative debate on the use of foreign law will
shape its outcome. Therefore, it is necessary to interrogate how all
participants and society conceptualize the parameters of the
debate. The sociology of the stranger may illuminate this inquiry
on foreign law, as it has been useful in better understanding the

21 Sandy Adams, ADAMS: Ban Foreign Law from Courts, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/9/in-recent-yearssupreme-court-justices-have-interj/.
22 While I argue that strangers are socially constructed, I do not argue that the
construction of strangers is necessarily deliberate, or that individuals and groups
that construct the stranger are even cognizant or aware that they are involved in a
social process that is constructing a stranger identity.
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social lives and societal responses to foreigners and outsiders in a
variety of settings.23
Additionally, from a sociological and theoretical standpoint,
the empirical example of foreign law as a site for observation may
help push and advance the theory of the sociological stranger. Can
the concept be broadened to include the material products that
people produce, as opposed to the people themselves? Can the
concept of the stranger be applied to non-material objects, like
ideas? Instead of talking about stranger relations, I argue that
Georg Simmel’s original notion of the stranger and stranger
relations can be deconstructed and broadened to discuss a
generalized ‘strangeness’ that explains a wide variety of social
interactions not solely limited to the stranger (interactions between
people), but one that also includes strange things (interactions
between people and cultural objects).
This Article begins in Part 2 with a critical review of the
sociological literature that theorizes the stranger. I continue this
inquiry by grounding theory in an empirical case study of senate
judiciary confirmation hearings for nominees to the Supreme Court
of the United States. The high profile nature of these proceedings
provides a great site to observe the political attempts and processes
to transform foreign laws into strangers. I discuss the methods
used in designing the research study of confirmation hearings in
Part 3. In Part 4, I present my results where I analyze how legal
and political elites understand and make meaning of foreign law.
This Section illustrates the various framing techniques and
conflicts that lead to the production of foreign law as a dangerous
stranger. These results are discussed in relation to the previous
literature in Part 5, where I also touch on a theory of conflict that
may offer a better explanation of strangers than a functionalist
account. Finally, I conclude briefly and offer thoughts for future
research.
2.

THEORIZING THE STRANGER

This Section critically reviews the relevant literature on the
stranger in order to describe and better theorize the citation of
foreign and international law in American society. A key
23 See generally, Robert Ezra Park, Cultural Conflict and the Marginal Man, in 1
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF ROBERT EZRA PARK 372–76 (Everett Cherrington Hughes
et al. eds., 1974); MARGARET MARY WOOD, THE STRANGER: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS (1934).
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component to this literature is that a stranger—or strangeness
more generally—is a specific form of social interaction.24
Therefore, this project seeks to understand how human interaction
changes and affects the use of foreign law. This Section proceeds
with defining the sociological concept of the stranger, and seeks to
understand the various cultural, functional, and structural reasons
for the existence of the stranger.
2.1. What Is a Stranger?
Most sociological discussions of the stranger have their origins
in Georg Simmel’s 1908 work called “The Stranger.” At the heart
of Simmel’s stranger is the notion of ambivalence and competing
duality. He writes that while the stranger may hold a meaningful
place in the intimate personal relations of society, he is no
“landowner” in the social environment.25 The stranger has the
specific character of mobility and is therefore not fixed with respect
to the origin of society. Simmel writes:
He is fixed within a certain spatial circle—or within a group
whose boundaries are analogous to spatial boundaries—but
his position within it is fundamentally affected by the fact
that he does not belong in it initially and that he brings
qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to
it.26
The sociological literature on the stranger further develops the
notion of the stranger’s duality at odds with itself. Scholars
describe the stranger as a being who operates on both sides of
social borders. The language used to describe strangers in main
societies encompasses concepts linked to hospitality and hostility,
and the stranger can act as a guest or an enemy, and at times
24 Simmel wrote that “[t]he state of being a stranger is of course a completely
positive relation; it is a specific form of interaction.” Georg Simmel, The Stranger,
in GEORG SIMMEL: ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS 143, 143 (Donald N. Levine
ed., 1971).
25 Simmel writes: “Although in the sphere of intimate personal relations the
stranger may be attractive and meaningful in many ways, so long as he is
regarded as a stranger he is no ‘landowner’ in the eyes of the other.” Id. at 145.
Earlier in the essay, Simmel expands on his notion of the stranger’s landlessness,
writing that “[t]he stranger is by his very nature no owner of land—land not only
in the physical sense but also metaphorically as a vital substance which is fixed, if
not in space, then at least in an ideal position within the social environment.” Id.
at 144.
26 Id. at 143.
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simultaneously serve as both depending on the social moment.27
Beck writes that the “stranger has lost for himself the reference
point of being here, of being at home. There are natives and
foreigners, friends and enemies—and there are strangers who do
not categorically fit into this model, who dodge, obstruct, and
irritate oppositions.”28 Bauman writes of such irritations when he
says that “they [strangers] befog and eclipse the boundary lines
We can think about
which ought to be clearly seen.”29
communities as having boundaries that distinguish insiders from
outsiders. The insiders are positioned safely within the boundary,
while the outsider exists beyond social boundaries. The stranger,
however, is located on the boundary. Monterescu discusses the
stranger as “located on the boundary between the group and what
lies outside it.”30 But due to the ambivalent and mobile nature of
the stranger, the stranger is not fixed on the boundary. The
stranger can cross boundaries and, in doing so, “defines and defies
[community] boundaries, or builds bridges over them.”31
2.2. Why the Stranger?
2.2.1. Functional
Karakayali wisely asks the question “why are there
‘strangers’?”32 Karakayali wants to understand what would
motivate people to enter into relations that Simmel states is an
unclear, ambiguous, twilight social position.33 Karakayali argues
that instead of labeling individuals as strangers, it would be easier

27 See e.g., Rudolf Stichweh, Stranger, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY 599,
599–600 (Austin Harrington et al. eds., 2006).
28 Ulrich Beck, How Neighbors Become Jews: The Political Construction of the
Stranger in an Age of the Stranger in an Age of Reflexive Modernity, 2 CONSTELLATIONS
378, 383 (1996).
29 Zygmunt Bauman, Making and Unmaking of Strangers, 43 THESIS ELEVEN 1, 1
(1995).
30 Daniel Monterescu, Stranger Masculinities: Gender and Politics in a
Palestinian-Israeli “Third Space”, in ISLAMIC MASCULINITIES 123, 127 (Lahoucine
Ouzgane ed., 2006).
31 Tanya M. Cassidy, ‘Race to the Park’: Simmel, the Stranger and the State, 8
IRISH COMM. REV. 14, 15 (2000).
32 Nedim Karakayali, The Uses of the Stranger: Circulation, Arbitration, Secrecy,
and Dirt, 24 SOC. THEORY 312, 313 (2006).
33 Id. at 313.
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to expel them from, or adopt them into, society.34 Partly relying on
examples that Simmel provides, Karakayali offers a functionalist
argument and states that strangers exist because “strangers often
carry out special tasks that no one else in the group is capable of
(or willing to) perform.”35 Karakayali identifies four functions,
categorizing the stranger as a: (1) circulator of items (i.e., goods,
money, and information); (2) arbiter and resolver of conflict; (3)
police or manager of secret/sacred domains; and (4) cleanser of
group impurities, or performer of “‘dirty jobs.’”36
While Karakayali’s functionalist argument provides valuable
insight into understanding the role of strangers in society, there are
two issues that limit its explanatory power. First, the claim that
adoption or expulsion might be easier alternatives doesn’t stand up
to scrutiny. Karakayali argues that maintaining a hybrid category,
like a stranger, must provide some benefit to society because
absorbing or expelling a group would “require much less ‘effort,’
much less institutionalization,” and would likely “lead to much
fewer complications than stranger-relations.”37 To test this claim,
one needs simply to consider opposition to undocumented
Mexican immigration to the United States.
Mexican
undocumented immigrants serve a beneficial function to the
societies that they live and work in.38 Challengers of antiimmigration policies often ask individuals to imagine the costly
and inconvenient world if immigrant labor were removed from the
economy.39 Following Karakayali’s thesis, it would be easier if we
34 Id.
Bauman addresses the same question, noting that nation-states
deployed both anthropophagic (annihilation through the processes of assimilation
and absorption) and anthropoemic (banishing through the process of exclusion
and expulsion from the social world) strategies for dealing with modern
strangers). Bauman, supra note 29, at 2.
35 Karakayali, supra note 32, at 313.
36 Id. at 313. In addition, Virnoche highlights Karakayali’s second use of the
stranger, noting that the stranger can serve as one who can hold on to secrets,
specifically, a “safekeeper of shared hopes, dreams and fears.” Mary E. Virnoche,
The Stranger Transformed: Conceptualzing [sic] On and Offline Stranger Disclousure
[sic], 24 SOC. THOUGHT & RESEARCH 343, 344 (2002).
37 Karakayali, supra note 32, at 313.
38 See, e.g., JUDITH GANS, UNIV. OF ARIZ. UDALL CTR. FOR STUD. IN PUB. POL’Y,
IMMIGRANTS IN ARIZONA: FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS
(2008),
http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/immigration/publications/impactofimmigrants0
8.pdf (assessing the impact of Mexican immigrants on Arizona’s fiscal health).
39 See Dean E. Murphy, The Nation: A New Order; Imagining Life Without Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/
weekinreview/the-nation-a-new-order-imagining-life-without-illegal-
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either legally absorbed Mexican immigrants as permanent legal
residents/citizens, or expelled them from the United States and
deported them to Mexico. Yet instead, we enter into strangerrelations with them because they confer a benefit to society.
Karakayali overlooks the empirical reality that adoption and
exclusion might require so much effort that society cannot afford
the price. Integrating current immigrants into American society is
costly. Undocumented immigrants would need access to social
services. The granting of these social services might encourage
more individuals to see the United States as a place for
opportunity.
Expelling undocumented immigrants from the
United States, while possible, would require intense police
surveillance of borders and domestic immigrant communities and
workplaces.
This intense border monitoring is extremely
40
expensive.
The second limitation of Karakayali’s claim is situated in
general critiques of the weakness of strict functional arguments.
Functional arguments are criticized because they fail to account for
social change, and they can be, in a sense, tautological. For
example, Karakayali’s account fails to explain why some
immigrant groups with long histories in the United States (i.e.,
Mexicans) maintain stranger-relations, while other immigrant
groups originally labeled as strangers (i.e., the Irish) were able to
escape stranger-relations. Understanding the function of the
stranger is useful because it helps articulate the processes that lead
to the continued existence of the stranger. Yet, I believe that in
order to understand the existence of the stranger and strange laws
requires examining the structures and social conditions that enable
their construction and production.
2.2.2. Structural/Social Construction
While Simmel acknowledged the functional activities of the
stranger, he suggests that this functionality is marginalized.
Simmel’s work explores how structural forces produce the
immigrants.html (exploring American society without illegal immigrants). Gans
seeks to answer this question in the state of Arizona through simulated modeling.
GANS, supra note 38, at 5.
40 AMALIA GREENBERG DELGADO & JULIA HARUMI MASS, AM. C.L. UNION OF N.
CAL., COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: THE HIGH PRICE OF POLICING IMMIGRANT
COMMUNITIES (2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/
police_practices/costs_and_consequences.pdf.
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stranger. He writes that strangers emanate from “a distinct
structure composed of remoteness and nearness.”41 In an attempt
to understand why strangers exist, Bauman highlights structural
forces that work to create strangers, which complement functional
explanations. He writes that “[a]ll societies produce strangers; but
each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and
produces them in its own inimitable way.”42 Bauman argues that
strangers are the by-product of the nation-state’s boundary
drawing and are problematic because of “their capacity to befog
and eclipse the boundary lines which ought to be clearly seen.”43
Bauman distinguishes between modern and postmodern
strangers. He writes that:
[t]he typical modern strangers were the waste of the state’s
ordering zeal. What the modern strangers did not fit was
the vision of order. When you draw dividing lines and set
apart the so divided, everything that blurs the lines and
spans the divisions undermines the work and mangles its
products . . . . Their mere being around interfered with the
work which the state swore to accomplish, and undid its
efforts to accomplish it. The strangers exhaled uncertainty
where certainty and clarity should have ruled.44
Where modern strangers are the by-products of modernity’s
attempt to order, postmodern strangers were the result of the
ongoing and never-ending process of identity building.45 Bauman
also adds that in our postmodern times, the boundaries that are
both strongly desired and missed center around identity. For
Bauman, this centering around identity implicates the “rightful
and secure position in the society, of a space unquestionably one’s
own, where one can plan one’s life with the minimum of
interference, play one’s role in a game in which the rules do not
change overnight and without notice, act reasonably and hope for
the better.”46
Bauman agrees with Karakayali that there are two strategies
that society can deploy with respect to strangers: (1) to assimilate
41
42
43
44
45
46

Simmel, supra note 24, at 145.
Bauman, supra note 29, at 1.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
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the strangers and transform them into insiders, or (2) to banish the
strangers and exclude them as outsiders.47 However, Bauman
identifies these strategies as responses to the modern stranger in
societies’ attempts to maintain order and create boundary
markers.48 The response to the postmodern stranger moves
beyond assimilation and expulsion to a method of ongoing
management. In a postmodern world, the nation-state—being
more concerned with the construction of identity as opposed to
sheer order—cannot erase the stranger, and therefore employs a
never-ending project where the stranger is invented and socially
produced/constructed.49 The stranger is then used as a signal for
the boundaries of what is acceptable with respect to identity.
Bauman writes that
the postmodern [strangers] are by common consent or
resignation, whether joyful or grudging, here to stay. To
paraphrase Voltaire’s comment on God: if they did not
exist, they would have to be invented. And they are indeed
invented, zealously and with gusto, patched together with
salient or minute and unobtrusive distinction marks. They
are useful precisely in their capacity of stranger; their
strangerhood is to be protected and caringly preserved.
They are indispensable signposts in the life itinerary
without plan and direction. They must be as many and as
protean as the successive and parallel incarnations of
identity in the never ending search for itself.50
This structural-functionalist perspective identifies that while
the stranger may hold some social function that benefits society,
there are actors who perform work and are engaged in the
production of strangers. This work either creates the social
conditions and structures for which a society can conceptualize a
group of individuals as strangers (i.e., drawing boundaries of
insiders/outsiders when groups exist that do not fit the binary
distinction), or invents and constructs a group as a social stranger
(i.e., via labeling and ongoing management practices) in pursuit of
a specific function.

47
48
49
50

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 12.
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2.3. Distinguishing Strangeness
Marotta points out that there is a conceptual distinction
between the stranger and strangeness.51 He writes that the notion
of strangeness is linked to the spatial distance and proximity
between social actors. For Marotta, strangeness exists when social
actors “who are physically close are socially and culturally
distant.”52 Strangeness and an individual being constructed as a
stranger may overlap, but it might not. Marotta illustrates this
point by arguing that young people—who aren’t considered or
constructed as strangers—may experience strangeness while living
in close proximity to their parents because they feel social and
cultural distance due to differing values and ideas.53 What
constitutes their strangeness can be tied to culture and described as
the close proximity of their divergent cultural views.
Alexander highlights the importance of culture in
understanding the social construction of strangeness and takes
issue with Simmel’s overemphasis on social structure.54 He argues
that in order to understand strangeness, one must be aware of the
cultural interpretation of social structures.55 He states that “it is the
construction of difference . . . that makes potentially marginal
groups into dangerous [strangers].”56 Alexander states that
structural marginality alone doesn’t produce strangeness.57 He
gives examples of the Protestant English who immigrated to the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in the first half of the 17th century who
were “never convicted of strangeness.”58 While these immigrants
underwent years of forced indentured servitude, they eventually
became equal workers and citizens.59

51 Vince
P. Marotta, The Cosmopolitan Stranger, in QUESTIONING
COSMOPOLITANISM 105, 107 (Stan Hooft & Wim Vandekerckhove eds., 2010).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Jeffrey C. Alexander, Rethinking Strangeness: From Structures in Space to
Discourses in Civil Society, 79 THESIS ELEVEN 87, 91 (2004) (“[W]e must focus on the
cultural interpretation of social structures and the categories within which these
active interventions are made.”).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 92.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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Stichweh reaffirms the possibility that culture may have a role
in the production of strangeness. He notes that even in the
presence of foreigners, there are societies incapable of “recognizing
strangers.”60 He points to a 1930s example where native New
Guinea tribes identified foreign Australian gold prospectors that
they unexpectedly encountered as returning tribe members.61 This
is an example of a possible cultural interpretation of structural
difference that didn’t lead to strangeness. Even when foreigners
are strangers, they don’t necessarily have to be conceptualized as
dangerous. In fact, Appiah believes the contrary and argues that
valuable learning can occur via cosmopolitan exchange between
strangers with different values, backgrounds, and norms.62
Alexander states that if we are to understand what makes a
stranger, we must look beyond the stranger’s structural position
and examine how culture intervenes and allows the dominant
group in society to assume a specific group occupies a place of
strangeness.63 He writes:
We discover that the employment of the language of
strangeness creates the strangeness of a status, not the other
way around. This is not to deny that many and various
social structural pressures come into play. Imperialism
may lead to the demand for rationalizing ideology;
immigration may lead to the need to defend jobs; economic
impoverishment may lead to renewed class conflict;
military defeat or political instability may provide
opportunities for new social actors to take power. None of
these factors, however, can, in and of themselves, specify
who will be constructed as strange, or how.64
If Bauman is correct, and we are in a postmodern moment
where the ongoing construction of identity is of great social
importance, then it might help us to think about expanding the
60 Rudolf Stichweh, Strangers in World Society – Indifference and Minimal
Sympathy, in SCIENCE + FICTION: BETWEEN NANOWORLDS AND GLOBAL CULTURE 111
(Stefan Iglhaut & Thomas Spring eds., 2004).
61 Id.
62 See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A
WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006).
63 For example, Alexander notes that the physical/structural segregation of
Blacks in the U.S. did not precede white American’s cultural construction of Black
strangeness. See Alexander, supra note 54, at 93.
64 Id.
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idea of the stranger to not just think about stranger relations as
social interactions solely between individuals, but to follow in the
footsteps of Marotta and Alexander and think about the much
broader concept of strangeness in an attempt to capture not only
the individual and social interaction, but also those cultural
artifacts—both tangible and intangible—that are key to the
formation, composition, and production of social identity. Other
social theorists discuss strangeness and the stranger in a nonhuman form, particularly with respect to technology and the
transmission of information.65
3.

METHOD

To understand the production of meaning surrounding the use
of foreign and international law following the landmark Supreme
Court rulings, this Article examines the senate judiciary
confirmation hearings of nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court.
These hearings provide an active site where academic, legal, and
political elites discussed the meaning and role of foreign law after
their use became controversial in 2003. The method used to
analyze the hearings was a qualitative content analysis that
searched for mentions of a judge’s use of foreign and international
law.
The method was systematic. I gathered all of the available and
searchable information on the Supreme Court nominee senate
judiciary committee confirmation hearings.
Records were
available for every nominee after 1971 with the exception of
rejected nominee Robert Bork.66 I searched for the terms “foreign”
and “international” in the available records of each nominee and
found that mentions of foreign or international law with respect to
judicial citation were present in the hearing transcripts of
O’Connor (1981), Roberts (2005), Alito (2006), Sotomayor (2009),
65 See e.g., William Bogard, Simmel in Cyberspace: Strangeness and Distance in
Postmodern Communications, 1 SPACE & CULTURE 23 (1999) (discussing the
technology of cyberspace and computers as Simmelian stranger); Mary E.
Virnoche, The Stranger Transformed: Conceptualzing [sic] On and Offline Stranger
Disclousure [sic], 24 SOC. THOUGHT & RESEARCH 343 (2002) (arguing that
telecommunications transforms social interactions between strangers and
proposing the concept of stranger-making technologies that create remoteness
and distance identified by Simmel).
66 The list includes Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and the elevation of
Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice.
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and Kagan (2010). This was not surprising because prior to 2003,
the citation of foreign law was not a politically contested issue.
The Roberts nomination was the first Supreme Court nomination
to follow 2003.
After identifying the text of the testimony relevant to this
project, I coded. Coding is the process of transforming “raw” data
into a form that is standardized and able to be used in
comparisons.67 Coding generates themes and a conceptual scheme
for organizing the data and understanding meaning of the
concepts—in this instance the citation to foreign authority—being
observed and analyzed
4.

DATA/RESULTS

The earliest mention of the use of foreign ideas in conjunction
with the interpretation of American law in the senate confirmation
hearings occurred in the testimony of a witness towards the end of
Sandra Day O’Connor’s hearing. Anne Neamon, the national
coordinator for an organization called Citizens for God and
Country, sought affirmation in the public record that nominee
O’Connor was loyal to the “U.S. Constitution, Christian law
priority.”68 Neamon expressed concern that “foreign ideology”
had “illegally altered” and “misrepresented” the U.S.
Constitution.69 She wanted the committee to question whether
O’Connor would challenge the “status of plaintiffs whose policies
advocate foreign ideological changes to our Constitution, such as
some members of the left-thinking membership of ABA, ACLU,
and others who propagate communistic worldwide atheism.” 70
Contrasted to today’s political climate, Anne Neamon’s query
about foreign influence on American law is interesting, given the
fact that not one member of the committee raised this issue during
O’Connor’s questioning. This is evident in the following exchange
between Neamon and the committee chairman:
Ms. NEAMON. Senator, since these matters were never
brought out by any member of the committee, in justice to
67 For a discussion of coding qualitative data, see CARL F. AUERBACH & LOUISE
B. SILVERSTEIN, QUALITATIVE DATA: AN INTRODUCTION TO CODING AND ANALYSIS
(2003).
68 Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 385–86 (1981).
69 Id. at 385.
70 Id. at 386.
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the national outcries, the moral crisis, and the President’s
anxiety to restore U.S. Constitution and our ethics, could
you find opportunity to address these questions to the
nominee?
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have made your statement.
That will be available to all the Senators.
Ms. NEAMON. I wonder if they will find the time to really,
collectively address it, and will the nominee have the
opportunity to respond to their addressing of this matter?
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you see, the nominee now is through
with her testimony, and it is too late to address questions in
these proceedings.
Ms. NEAMON. Can she be recalled?
The CHAIRMAN. No; we cannot recall her. We are giving
everybody an opportunity. We have had 3 days of
hearings.
Ms. NEAMON. Thank you very much. I would appreciate it
if there was anything you could do to extend your
concerns, at least.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.71
Neamon’s presence at the senate judiciary committee gives some
evidence that while probably a super-minority, there were some
who thought, and sought to construct a platform, that foreign ideas
had a negative effect on American law. It is noteworthy that her
particular framing of the issue was not publicly shared by any
member of the senate judiciary committee, and that her views,
while entered into the record, were given little publicity and no
discussion. Decades later, however, starting with the hearings for
nominee John Roberts, a number of conservative senators would
replicate Neamon’s framing of foreign ideas and begin questioning
nominees’ views on the use of foreign law.
Before examining how senators and witnesses use the political
confirmation process to construct and contest frames surrounding
foreign law, it is useful to understand the ways in which these
actors agree. Examining the points of convergence amongst
adversaries illuminates the parameters of contestation and the
71

Id. at 387.
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borders of group identity. All of the actors gathered at the senate
judiciary hearing agreed on a number of points, including the
accepted and unacceptable uses of foreign and international.
4.1. Shared Understanding/Agreement
4.1.1. Accepted Uses
Conservative nominee Samuel Alito acknowledged that there
are appropriate situations for a judge to use foreign law. He said:
There are other legal issues that come up in which I think it
is legitimate to look to foreign law. For example, if a
question comes up concerning the interpretation of a treaty
that has been entered into by many countries, I don’t see
anything wrong with seeing the way the treaty has been
interpreted in other countries. I wouldn’t say that that is
controlling, but it is something that is useful to look to.
In private litigation, it is often the case—I have had cases
like this in which the rule of decision is based on foreign
law. There may be a contract between parties and the
parties will say this contract is to be governed by the laws
of New Zealand or wherever. So, of course, there, you have
to look to the law of New Zealand or whatever the country
is.
So there are situations in litigation that come up in Federal
court when it is legitimate to look to foreign law, but I don’t
think it is helpful in interpreting our Constitution.72
The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick
Leahy, cited to this quote by Alito years later in the questioning of
liberal court nominee Elena Kagan, just after Senator Jon Kyl, a
Republican conservative senator, questioned Kagan about the
relevance of the use of foreign law:
Senator LEAHY. Incidentally, I have a quote here, there are
other legal issues that come up in which I think it’s
legitimate to look to foreign law. For example, if a question
comes up concerning the interpretation of a treaty that has

72 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 370–71 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing].
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been entered into by many countries, I don’t see anything
wrong with seeing the way the treaty has been interpreted
in other countries and other—look at their foreign law. I
wouldn’t say that’s controlling, but it’s something that’s
useful to look to. That’s what Justice Salito [sic] said in his
confirmation hearing. I don’t recall anybody disagreeing
with him. Do you disagree with that?
Ms. KAGAN. No, that sounds right.73
There also seems to be a consensus that does not object to the use
of foreign law if it is constitutive of the origin of the U.S. legal
system. This is illustrated in the following exchange between
nominee Alito and Senator Leahy:
Judge ALITO. Well, the Cruzan case proceeded assumed for
the sake of argument, which is something that judges often
do, that there is a constitutional right to say—that each of
us has a constitutional right to say, ‘‘I don’t want medical
treatment.’’ And the Cruzan decision recognized that this
was a right that everybody had at common law. At
common law, if someone is subjected to a medical
procedure that the person doesn’t want, that’s a battery and
it’s a tort, and the person can sue for it. It is illegal. The
Court did not—
Senator LEAHY.
One of those cases where we got
something from that foreign law, in this case English
common law; is that correct?
Judge ALITO. Well, that’s correct, and I think that our
whole legal system is an outgrowth of English common
law.
Senator LEAHY. That popped in to my mind because I was
thinking of some of the people talking about paying
attention to foreign law. Most of our law is based on
foreign law. But go ahead, common law.
Judge ALITO. Most of our common law is an outgrowth of
English common law, and I think it helps to understand
that background often in analyzing issues that come up.74
73 The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 260–61
(2010) [hereinafter Kagan Hearing].
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Alito registers no problems with the use of foreign law like English
common law because the U.S. legal system has its origins in this
system, and therefore it might provide more information that
could allow for a better interpretation of the American law on
which it is based.
4.1.2. Unacceptable Uses
There also seems to be overwhelming consensus amongst
American judges that foreign law cannot be used as a form of
precedent that acts as binding authority on U.S. courts. In her
confirmation hearings, Kagan noted that she did not think that
foreign law held “any kind of precedential weight” and that it was
not an “independent ground” for judicial decision-making.75
Repeatedly throughout her confirmation, Sotomayor emphasized
the norm that foreign law cannot be used as a source of precedent
after Senators Coburn, Sessions, and Cornyn confronted her with
the question of whether she would use foreign law.76 In her
responses, Sotomayor made it clear that foreign law could not be
used as a holding or as a source of binding precedent. The
following exchange between Sotomayor and Senator Coburn
exemplifies her typical response:
Senator COBURN. So you stand by it. There is no authority
for a Supreme Court Justice to utilize foreign law in terms
of making decisions based on the Constitution or statutes?
Judge SOTOMAYOR. Unless the statute requires you or
directs you to look at foreign law, and some do by the way,
the answer is no. Foreign law cannot be used as a holding
or a precedent or to bind or to influence the outcome of a
legal decision interpreting the Constitution or American
law that doesn’t direct you to that law.77
Sotomayor, along with all of the other nominees surveyed in this
project, acknowledged clearly that foreign law was not a

Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 580–81.
Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 259.
76 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 340–50, 396–97, 463–65 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor
Hearing].
77 Id. at 349.
74
75
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controlling authority. No actor who participated in the hearings
voiced a dissenting opinion.
4.2. Otherness and Boundaries
The social production of the stranger requires an important
first step. There must be some structural feature or border that
distinguishes
the
insider/inner-boundary
from
some
outsider/outer-boundary. The data presented in this Section
demonstrate how some conservative actors of the senate judiciary
hearings use social structure and culture to place social distance
between society and foreign and international law. The goal of
these actors is to push foreign law into the periphery. If
unsuccessful, these framings place foreign law closer to the
insider/outsider border (or on the border) and transform it into a
stranger. This border may be inscribed on the stranger, or due to
the stranger’s mobility and lack of fixity, the stranger may make us
aware of the border (or be used to define the border) as the
stranger moves back and forth across boundaries (or the
boundaries are moved).
4.2.1. Proper Authority and the Constitution
Throughout the hearings, Republicans characterized foreign
citation as a practice without any support in the U.S. Constitution,
domestic law, or the oath of office. Because law does not offer any
authority to use foreign law, then conservatives view the citation of
foreign authorities as exceeding accepted boundaries. Republicans
developed and utilized this theme extensively in the questioning of
Sotomayor. In an exchange with the nominee, Senator Coburn
said:
You have taken the oath already twice and, if confirmed,
will take it again. And I want to repeat it again. It has been
said once this morning. Here is the oath: ‘‘I do solemnly
swear or affirm that I will administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich, and will faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon me under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, so help me
God.”
It does not reference foreign law anywhere. . . .
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I think this oath succinctly captures the role of a judge, and
I am concerned about some of your statements in regard to
that. Your judicial philosophy might be—and I am not
saying it is—inconsistent with the impartial, neutral arbiter
that the oath describes.78
Coburn clearly questions Sotomayor’s judicial philosophy as
suspect and inconsistent with her duties as a judge. As a result,
Coburn argues that because the Constitution does not expressly
reference and allow the use of foreign law, then it must therefore
expressly forbid it. Following Coburn’s perspective, Sotomayor’s
advocacy for the use of foreign law is antithetical to the role of an
impartial judge.
In questioning nominee Kagan, Coburn repeats the idea that
because the U.S. Constitution makes no reference to foreign law, its
use is, therefore, forbidden.
All right. Let me read something to you. As is obvious, I’m
not a lawyer. OK. It’s pretty obvious. But Article 3,
Section 2 says this: ‘‘The judicial power shall extend to all
cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and the treaties made.’’
Nowhere—nowhere—in our Constitution does it give the
authority for any judge, chief justice of the Supreme Court,
any jurist on the Supreme Court, or any other court, to
reference foreign law in determining the interpretation of
what our statutes or our Constitution will be. So this is an
area where we have grasp, where our judicial majority,
much like the Israeli judge, we start reaching beyond the
Constitution. You said it was all law. You said the
determination will always be law. It’s down to law, law,
law, the earliest questions that you were asked in this
hearing. Well, this is the founding document of what the
law is. Nowhere that I can find, in this writing or in these
guys’ writing, says anything about using foreign law.

78

Id. at 39.
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So please explain to me why it’s OK sometime to use
foreign law to interpret our Constitution, our statutes, and
our treaties.79
Yet foreign origin does not necessarily equate into a person or item
being an outsider or othered. The Republican framing of foreign
law works to situate foreign law as an outsider that is somehow,
because of its origins, antithetical to the U.S. Constitution, laws,
and traditions. In this framing, there is no room for foreign law,
despite its origins, to ever be contemporaneously and currently, a
part of American law.
4.2.2. Disadvantaged Minority Status
In addition to situating foreign law in opposition to the U.S.
Constitution, another strategy that conservatives employed was to
link foreign law to the outsider status of American disadvantaged
social minorities. During the hearings, disadvantaged minority
identities—in the areas of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality—
were social attributes folded into the framing of foreign law as an
outsider. In the sole case of Sotomayor, conservatives established a
connection between the social identity of the nominee and her
advocacy for the citation of foreign law. Specifically, there were
attempts to link the subjectivity of her diverse ethnic and gendered
background to a bias in the use of foreign law. It was not

79 Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 175–76. Senator Coburn’s statement echoes
a portion of a question posed to the nominee Alito during his hearing. Coburn
said:

And Article III, section 2 really delineates the scope for the courts in this
country, and what it says is, “All cases in law and equity arising under
this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made, or
which shall be made under their authority.” So that really gives us the
scope under Article III, section 2. I was interested when Senator Kyl
asked you yesterday about foreign law. That is something extremely
disturbing to a lot of Americans, that many on the Supreme Court today
will reference or pick and choose the foreign law that they want to use to
help them make a decision to interpret our Constitution, where in fact,
the oath of office mentions no foreign law. Matter of fact it says the
obligation is to use the United States law, the Constitution and the
treaties, and that is exactly what Article III, section 2 says. So there is no
reference at all to foreign law in terms of your obligations or your
responsibility, and matter of fact, the absence of it would say that maybe
this ought to be what we use, and the codified law of the Congress and
the treaties rather than foreign law.
Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 470–71.
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uncommon for the senators to discuss Sotomayor’s race and
gender in the same breath as foreign law. For example in opening
statements, Senator Kyl said:
Many of Judge Sotomayor’s public statements suggest that
she may, indeed, allow, and even embrace, decisionmaking based on her biases and prejudices.
The wise Latina woman quote, which I referred to earlier,
suggests that Judge Sotomayor endorses the view that a
judge should allow gender, ethnic and experience-based
biases to guide her when rendering judicial opinions. This
is in stark contrast to Judge Paez’s view that these factors
should be set aside.
In the same lecture, Judge Sotomayor posits that ‘‘there is
no objective stance but only a series of perspectives. No
neutrality, no escape from choice in judging’’ and claims
that ‘‘the aspiration to impartiality is just that. It’s an
aspiration,’’ she says, ‘‘because it denies the fact that we are
by our experiences making different choices than others.’’
No neutrality, no impartiality in judging? Yet isn’t that
what the judicial oath explicitly requires?
Judge Sotomayor. [sic] clearly rejected the notion that
judges should strive for an impartial brand of justice. She
has already accepted that her gender and Latina heritage
will affect the outcome of her cases.
This is a serious issue, and it’s not the only indication that
Judge Sotomayor has an expansive view of what a judge
may appropriately consider.
In a speech to the Puerto Rican ACLU, Judge Sotomayor
endorsed the idea that American judges should use good
ideas found in foreign law so that America does not lose
influence in the world.
The laws and practices of foreign nations are simply
irrelevant to interpreting the will of the American people as
expressed through our Constitution.
Additionally, the vast expanse of foreign judicial opinions
and practices from which one might draw simply gives
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You can, therefore, understand my concern when I hear
Judge Sotomayor say that unless judges take it upon
themselves to borrow ideas from foreign jurisdictions,
America is ‘‘going to lose influence in the world.’’ That’s
not a judge’s concern.80
Senator Kyl made sure not simply to highlight that he believed that
Sotomayor was biased, but that she “accepted that her gender and
Latina heritage” was the source of that bias. In another instance,
Senator Coburn, in his opening statement in the Sotomayor
hearing, stated:
Your assertion that ethnicity and gender will make
someone a better judge, although I understand the feelings
and emotions behind that, I am not sure that could be
factually correct. Maybe a better judge than some, but not a
better judge than others.
The other statement, there is no objective stance but only a
series of perspectives, no neutrality, no escape from choice
in judging—what that implies, the fact that it is subjective
implies that it is not objective. And if we disregard
objective consideration of facts, then all rulings are
subjective, and we lose the glue that binds us together as a
Nation.
Even more important is your questioning of whether the
application of impartiality in judging, including
transcending personal sympathies and prejudices, is
possible in most cases or is even desirable is extremely
troubling to me.
You have taken the oath already twice and, if confirmed,
will take it again. And I want to repeat it again. It has been
said once this morning. Here is the oath: ‘‘I do solemnly
swear or affirm that I will administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich, and will faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon me under the

80

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 23.
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Constitution and the laws of the United States, so help me
God.’’
It does not reference foreign law anywhere. It does not
reference whether or not we lose influence in the
international community. We lost influence when we
became a country in the international community to several
countries. But the fact is that did not impede us from
establishing this great republic.81
Conservatives like Coburn portrayed Sotomayor as a Puerto
Rican woman holding racial, ethnic, and gender bias and linked
this to discussions on the impropriety of using foreign legal
sources. In addition to the comments made by senators, George
Mason professor Neomi Rao stated:
[T]here is the related issue of the role of personal
experiences in judicial decision-making. It would be hard
to deny that judges are human and made up of their unique
life journeys. Many judges recognize this and explain how
they strive to remain impartial by putting aside their
personal preferences.
Judge Sotomayor’s position, however, has suggested that
her personal background, her race, gender and life
experiences, should affect judicial decisions.82
One might argue that it was Sotomayor herself who established
a connection between her gender and ethnicity and bias when she
made the “wise Latina” comment referenced in Senator Kyl’s
opening statement.83 The infamous comment was made in a
speech that Sotomayor delivered at the University of California,
Berkeley School of Law, where she stated: “I would hope that a
wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male
who hasn’t lived that life.”84 Prior to the hearing, critics referred to

81
82
83
84

(2002).

Id. at 39.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 18.
Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/2

02_LYKE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/30/2014

MAKING STRANGE LAWS

703

the statement as racist and sexist.85 This assessment of Sotomayor’s
bias can only be achieved by taking Sotomayor’s comment out of
context. The “wise Latina” comment was made while she was
talking about the effect of social background on decision-making
and the value of diversity in the judiciary.
In addition, this linkage between social identity and bias could
only be achieved by ignoring similar statements of other justices
who relayed struggles based on social identity, albeit not
specifically what we consider today as disadvantaged minority
status. For example, during his confirmation, Alito stated that his
Italian heritage influenced his decision-making process. In an
attempt to rehabilitate the impression that Alito didn’t care about
the less fortunate, Senator Coburn requested that Alito provide a
comment that allowed the committee to “see a little bit of your
Alito responded:
“When I get a case about
heart.”86
discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family who
suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or
because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that into
account.”87 Senator Coburn did not subject Alito’s hearing
statements to the same accusations of bias and subjectivity inflicted
on Sotomayor.
Highlighting the disadvantaged racial and gendered status of
Sotomayor was not the only means that conservatives attempted to
other foreign law. Discriminatory responses to same-sex sexual
orientation were also part of the narrative framing that senators
used in their discussions of foreign law. In his opening statement
in the Roberts hearing, Senator Cornyn discusses the problematic
nature of foreign law in conjunction with the elimination of the
child death penalty in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons.88 In the next
breath, he mentions the Lawrence sodomy law decision.
On what legitimate basis can the Supreme Court uphold
State laws on the death penalty in 1989, then strike them
down in 2005, relying not on the written Constitution,
which, of course, had not changed, but on foreign laws that
no American has voted on, consented to, or may even be
85 Morgan Weiland, Have Sotomayor’s Critics Actually Read Her Berkeley
Speech?, MEDIA MATTERS (May 29, 2009, 8:15 PM), http://mediamatters.org/
research/200905290049.
86 Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 475.
87 Id.
88 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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aware of? When in 2003 the Court decided Lawrence v.
Texas, the Court overruled a 1986 decision on the
constitutionality of State laws based on the collective moral
judgment of those States about permissible sexual activity.
What changed in that intervening time?
Did the
Constitution change? Well, no. Did the Justices change?
Yes. But should that determine a different meaning of the
Constitution? Are some judges merely imposing their
personal preferences under the guise of constitutional
interpretation? Indeed, this was the same case, as you
know, Judge Roberts, that served as the cornerstone of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision holding that State
laws limiting marriage to a man and a woman amounted to
illegal discrimination.89
Cornyn then linked the Lawrence decision to the state provision of
same-sex marriage rights. Senator Sessions explicitly linked his
opposition to foreign law to the Lawrence sodomy law decision.
Such vague standards provide the Court a license to
legislate, a power the Constitution did not provide judges.
Indeed, recently this license has led some judges to
conclude they may look beyond American standards of
decency to the standards of foreign nations in an attempt to
justify their decisions. The arrogant nature of this concept
is further revealed by a Supreme Court ruling in 2003,
when the Supreme Court explicitly declared that the
Constitution prohibits the elected representatives of the
people—us—from relying on established morality as a
basis for the laws they pass. The Court thus declares itself
free to, in effect, amend the Constitution by redefining its
words to impose whatever it decides is evolving standards
of decency. Yet at the same time, it prohibits legislatures
from enacting laws based on objective standards of
morality.90
While Sessions did not acknowledge the Lawrence decision by
name, there is no other 2003 Supreme Court ruling that involved
issues of morality, American standards of decency, and the laws of
89 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
42 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing].
90 Id. at 30–31.
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foreign nations. It appears that the opposition to foreign law is
rooted in an opposition to the expansion of rights to same-sex
attracted men and women. The senators in opposition to foreign
and international law have not only othered foreign law, but
grounded their opposition to foreign law to an opposition of
disadvantaged domestic ‘others’—particularly homosexuals, as
well as the racial and gendered othering of Sotomayor.
4.3. Bias
In addition to structurally identifying foreign and international
law as an other, conservatives have also worked to infuse meaning
into these boundaries of otherness.
Conservatives have
constructed foreign laws as biased. Republican members of the
senate judiciary committee do major work in constructing the
narrative that liberal judges are unobjective judicial activists who
use foreign law in violation of their constitutional oath and without
any recognized authority in order to legislate laws that meet their
own biased goals. Conservatives form this narrative of bias by
linking judges’ use of foreign law to (a) judicial activism, (b) a
reluctance to remain confined by domestic law, and (c) a desire to
step outside of established authority and beyond their judiciary
roles.
4.3.1. Judicial Activism
One of the most prevalent ways that conservatives attempted
to characterize the use of foreign law as a manifestation of bias was
to shroud the practice in the decades old trope of judicial activism.
Today, judicial activism popularly describes the decision making
of judges who are willing to ignore precedent and allow their
personal views to guide their decisions and find constitutional
violations in democratically promulgated laws.91 Usually judicial
activism is associated with politically liberal policy considerations.
Senator Brownback discussed judges’ use of foreign law in

91 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 922 (9th ed. 2009).
Other definitions of
judicial activism are not linked to the manifestation of a personal bias within a
judge, and instead describe how judges and courts use their power to impose
decisions on other branches of government. See e.g., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
THE SUPREME COURT A TO Z 236 (Kenneth Jost ed., 2d ed. 1998). Despite the term’s
prominence, the meaning of the term is obscure and has shifted through time. For
a more detailed conceptual and historical analysis of the term, see Craig Green,
An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009).
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association with a wide variety of contemporary political issues.
He said:
As I stated at Justice Roberts’s hearing, the Court has
injected itself into many of the political debates of our day,
and as my colleague Senator Cornyn has mentioned, the
Court has injected itself in the definition of marriage,
deciding whether or not human life is worth protecting,
permitting Government to transfer private property from
one person to another, even interpreting the Constitution
on the basis of foreign and international laws.
The Supreme Court has also issued and never reversed a
number of decisions that are repugnant to the
Constitution’s vision of human dignity and equality.
Although cases like Brown v. Board of Education in my State
are famous for correcting constitutional and court errors,
there remain several other instances in which the Court
strayed and stayed beyond the Constitution and the laws of
the United States. Among the most famous of these
Supreme Court cases of exercise of political power, I
believe, are the cases of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, two
1973 cases based on false statements which created a
constitutional right to abortion. And you can claim
whatever you want to of being pro-life or pro-choice, but
the right to abortion is not in the Constitution. The Court
created it. It created a constitutional right. And these
decisions removed a fully appropriate political judgment
from the people of several States and has led to many
adverse consequences.
For instance, it has led to the almost complete killing of a
whole class of people in America. As I noted to my
colleagues in the Roberts hearings, this year—this year—
between 80 to 90 percent of the children in America
diagnosed with Down syndrome will be killed in the womb
simply because they have a positive genetic test—which
can be wrong and is often wrong, but they would have a
positive genetic test for Down syndrome and they will be
killed.92

92

Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 46–47.
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Brownback makes a judicial activist critique as he claims that
the Court is working beyond its judicial role and is exercising more
political power.
Senator Mike DeWine aligned foreign law with judicial
activism in the following statement:
As of late, however, many Americans believe that the
Supreme Court is unmaking the very Constitution that our
Founders drafted. Many Americans are concerned when
they see the Court strike down laws protecting the aged,
the disabled and women who are the victims of violence.
Many Americans worry when they see the Court permit the
taking of private property for economic development.
Many are troubled when they see the Court cite
international law in its decisions, and many fear that our
Court is making policy when it repeatedly strikes down
laws passed by elected members of Congress and elected
members of State legislatures.
I must tell you, Judge, I too am concerned. Judges are not
members of Congress. They are not elected. They are not
members of State legislatures. They are not Governors.
They are not Presidents. Their job is not to pass laws,
implement regulations, nor to make policy. Perhaps no one
said this better than Justice Byron White. During his
confirmation hearing in 1962, White was asked to explain
the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional form of
Government. Nowadays, in response to this type question,
we probably would hear some grand theories about the
meaning of the Constitution and its history.
Justice White, however, said nothing of the kind. When he
was asked about the role of the Supreme Court in our
system of Government, he gave a simple answer. Justice
White said the role of the United States Supreme Court was
simply to decide cases.
To decide cases. So simple. It sounds too obvious to be
true, but, you know, I think that is the right answer. Judges
need to restrict themselves to the proper resolution of the
case before them. They need to avoid the temptation to set
broad policy. And they need to pay proper deference to the
role of the Executive, the Congress, and the States, while
closely guarding the language of the Constitution.
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We would do well to keep this example in mind. The
Constitution does not give us all the answers. It does,
however, create the perfect process for solving our
problems. The Congress and the President have a role in
this process, the States have theirs, and when there are
disputes, the courts are there to decide cases.
There is a reason that judges need to take on this limited
role. As my esteemed colleague from Iowa, Senator
Grassley, explained during Justice Souter’s confirmation
hearing, a judge should not be—and I quote—’’pro this and
anti that. He should rather be a judge of cases, not
causes.’’93
Senator Sessions stated:
This result-driven philosophy of activism does not respect
law. It is a post-modern philosophy that elevates outcomes
over law. Today many believe the law does not have an
inherent moral power and that words do not have and
cannot have fixed meanings. Judges are thus encouraged to
liberally interpret the words to reach the result the judge
believes is correct. Activist Supreme Court judges have
done this in recent years by saying they are interpreting the
plain words of the Constitution in light of evolving
standards of decency. This phrase has actually formed the
legal basis for a number of recent decisions. But as a legal
test, it utterly fails because the words can mean whatever a
judge wants them to mean. It is not objective, cannot be
consistently followed, and is thus by definition not law, but
a license.94
The judicial activism label is problematic because it
demonstrates bias, but also targets individuals to suggest they are
willing to work outside the system to further that bias.
4.3.2. Domestic Constraints
Republican members interpret and characterize the citation of
foreign law not only as a reflection of bias, but also its enabler.
Chief Justice Roberts in his confirmation hearings stated that

93
94

Roberts Hearing, supra note 89, at 25.
Id. at 30.
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selection bias exists when judges search for foreign precedent. He
said:
The other part of it that would concern me is that relying on
foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit
their discretion the way relying on domestic precedent
does. Domestic precedent can confine and shape the
discretion of the judges.
In foreign law you can find anything you want. If you
don’t find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the
decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever. As
somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law
for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out
your friends. You can find them, they’re there. And that
actually expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the
judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences,
cloak them with the authority of precedent because they’re
finding precedent in foreign law, and use that to determine
the meaning of the Constitution. I think that’s a misuse of
precedent, not a correct use of precedent.95
This quote exemplifies how, during the hearings, conservative
thinkers defined domestic law and precedent solely as objective
boundaries with the power to confine judges. Following this view,
the meaning of domestic law has no subjectivity. It is clear and
unambiguous and not subject to multiple interpretations.
Therefore, judges who disagree with a specific set meaning of
domestic law are biased. In order to implement their bias,
however, these unobjective judges need a mechanism like foreign
law to act as a precedent, which will authorize and strengthen their
position. Next, unobjective judges engage in a second round of
bias (i.e., selection bias), and choose those foreign cases that affirm
their positions.
This conservative interpretation of the judicial use of foreign
law does two things. First, it assumes that domestic laws are
objective and discrete and cannot be subjected to liberal
interpretation. As a result, all non-domestic laws are subjective
and can only be used to further biased actions. Second, this
interpretation assumes that judges feel the need to ‘cloak’ and
justify their biases using non-established foreign precedents in the
95

Id. at 201.
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face of other options (i.e., characterizing their rationales and
decisions as interpretations of established domestic precedent).
4.4. Danger
In addition to framing foreign law as biased and othered,
conservative senators went one step further to color the nature of
the strangeness. A distinct project—separate from the construction
of the outsider—seeks to interpret foreign law as dangerous. One
can imagine the innocuous foreign outsider. The senate judiciary
confirmation hearings, however, reveal a framing of foreign law as
a dangerous outsider not only unworthy of a judge’s time, but
whose use actually debilitates the American legal system.
The senators’ linking of foreign law to the concept of danger is
present early in the Sotomayor hearing during Senator Sessions’
opening statement. He said:
[T]his hearing is important because I believe our legal
system is at a dangerous crossroads. Down one path is the
traditional American system, so admired around the world,
where judges impartially apply the law to the facts without
regard to personal views.
This is the compassionate system because it is the fair
system. In the American legal system, courts do not make
the law or set policy, because allowing unelected officials to
make law would strike at the heart of our democracy. . . .
Down the other path lies a Brave New World where words
have no true meaning and judges are free to decide what
facts they choose to see. In this world, a judge is free to
push his or her own political or social agenda. I reject that
view, and Americans reject that view. . . . Judges have cited
foreign laws, world opinion, and a United Nations
resolution to determine that a State death penalty law was
unconstitutional.
I am afraid our system will only be further corrupted, I
have to say, as a result of President Obama’s views that, in
tough cases, the critical ingredient for a judge is the ‘‘depth
and breadth of one’s empathy,’’ as well as, his word, ‘‘their
broader vision of what America should be.’’96
96

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 5–6.
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It is not surprising that Sessions connects the use of foreign law to
the biased, activist judge, but what is additionally noteworthy is
that he characterizes this use as being located at a ‘dangerous
crossroads’ that he fears will further corrupt the American legal
system.
In questioning nominee Roberts, Senator Kyl also attaches
foreign law to a language of danger. He said:
I also think it would put us on a dangerous path by trying
to pick and choose among those foreign laws that we liked
or didn’t like. For example, many nations have a weak
protection for freedom to participate in or practice one’s
religion. Iran and some other Middle Eastern nations come
immediately to mind, but even a modern western nation
like France has placed restrictions on religious symbols in
the public square. That would be highly unlikely to pass
muster in U.S. courts. Should we look to France to tell us
what the Free Exercise Clause means, for example?
Even nations that share our common law tradition, such as
Great Britain, offer fewer civil liberty guarantees than we
do, and the press has far less freedom. Nations such as
Canada have allowed their judges to craft a constitutional
right to homosexual marriage.97
Senator Kyl points out that a judge’s method of selecting foreign
law simply in terms of what he or she likes may have some type of
bias. However, this method of biased selection is not the sole (or
primary) basis for his view that the use of foreign law can lead
society “on a dangerous path.” Kyl first notes the prevalence of
countries that in the American imagination occupy the status of a
Muslim religious otherness and then discusses how these Middle
Eastern nations do not vigorously protect religious freedom. Kyl
then moves to France, a more developed, non-Muslim, “modern
western nation” with a civil law history, and to other countries that
share the common law tradition of the United States in order to
demonstrate an American exceptionalism. He argues that whether
Muslim and developing, or modern and sharing our legal
traditions, these countries offer fewer guarantees of liberty. Kyl
points to one example when a nation like Canada provides more
civil liberties, i.e., the right to same-sex marriage, but does not
97

Roberts Hearing, supra note 89, at 200.
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specifically put that in the context of nations offering fewer
liberties. Kyl’s statement places American exceptionalism with
respect to the United States offering more civil liberties under a
rubric of danger. However, even when foreign nations offer more
liberty, i.e., Canada and same-sex marriage, this practice is still
linked to the concept of danger.
4.4.1. Diluted Meaning
Conservatives argue that the use of foreign law is dangerous
because it dilutes the meaning of the U.S. Constitution and
weakens the civil liberties already recognized under the law. In his
opening statement in the Roberts hearing, Senator DeWine
channels the great Chief Justice John Marshall to warn that the
Constitution can somehow be “unmade” through international
legal citations. He stated:
Former Chief Justice John Marshall once warned that, and I
quote, ‘‘People made the Constitution, and people can
unmake it.’’ It will be your job, in other words, to ensure
that our Constitution is never unmade.
As of late, however, many Americans believe that the
Supreme Court is unmaking the very Constitution that our
Founders drafted. . . . Many [Americans] are troubled when
they see the Court cite international law in its decisions,
and many fear that our Court is making policy when it
repeatedly strikes down laws passed by elected members of
Congress and elected members of State legislatures.98
Senator Sessions also discusses how the use of foreign law
dilutes the Constitution.
In an exchange with a witness,
Georgetown Law Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz, during the
Sotomayor confirmation hearing, Sessions said:
I think the foreign law matter is a big deal to me. Some
people make out like it is nothing to this, this is just talk.
But it is baffling to me how a person of discipline would
think that foreign opinions or foreign statutes or U.N.
resolutions could influence the interpretation of an
American statute, some of which may be 1970, 1776.

98

Id. at 25.
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I think you mentioned, Mr. Rosenkranz, that Americans
revere the Constitution.
I remember at a judicial
conference, 11th circuit, Professor Van Alstine said that if
you respect the Constitution, if you clearly respect it, you
will enforce it as it is written, whether you like it or not; if
you don’t do that, then you disrespect it and you weaken it.
And the next judge, someday further down the line, will be
even more likely to weaken it further and just because you
may like the direction somebody bent the Constitution this
year in this case does not mean you are going to like it in
the future, and our liberties then become greater at risk.99
Sessions clearly links foreign law to the weakening of the
Constitution and to risking the vitality of civil liberties.
Senators were not the only figures at the confirmation hearings
constructing foreign law as an agent of constitutional dilution.
Hearing witnesses also played a role in this process. For example,
during the Kagan hearing, Ed Whelan, President of the Ethics and
Public Policy Center, testified:
Ms. Kagan would also provide the fifth vote to continue the
court’s unprincipled practice of selectively relying on
foreign law to alter the meaning of the Constitution, one
part of a broader, transnationalist agenda that would
displace the constitutional processes of representative
government and dilute cherished constitutional rights to
free speech and religious liberty.100
While Rosenkranz doesn’t discuss the use of foreign law as
diluting or weakening constitutional rights, he does link foreign
law to a troubling alteration of the Constitution. He stated:
Those who would rely on such sources must be engaged in
a different project. They must be trying to update the
Constitution to bring it in line with world opinion. To put
the point most starkly, this sort of reliance on contemporary
foreign law must be, in essence, a mechanism of
constitutional change.
Foreign law changes all the time, and it has changed
continuously since the Founding. If modern foreign law is
99
100

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 555.
Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 341.
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relevant to constitutional interpretation, it follows that a
change in foreign law can alter the meaning of the United
States Constitution.
And that is why this issue is so important. The notion of
the court ‘‘updating’’ the Constitution to reflect its own
evolving view of good government is troubling enough.101
4.4.2. Anti-Democratic: Destroys Democracy
During the Alito confirmation hearing, Judge Alito and Senator
Coburn expressed that the use of foreign law is dangerous because
it undermines democracy. Alito testified that “[i]t undermines
democratic self-government and it is utterly impractical, given the
diversity of legal viewpoints worldwide.”102 In addition to being
anti-democratic, Coburn argued that foreign legal citation is a
violation of the Constitution. He stated:
It actually undermines democracy because you get a pick
and choose, and the people of this country do not get a pick
and choose that law, as people from a different country. So
it actually is a violation of the Constitution, and to me, I
very strongly and adamantly feel that it violates the good
behavior, which is mentioned as part of the qualifications
and the maintenance of that position.103
If Senator Coburn’s analysis were correct, then the citation of
foreign law could constitute a constitutional violation of a judge’s
oath and lead to potential impeachment. The hearings reveal
multiple voices and contestations on this issue, however. For
example, in the Roberts hearing, Senator Coburn notes that the
oath of office requires that a judge swear to perform his duties
under the laws of the United States. He then asks Roberts whether
relying on foreign precedent, which he characterizes as inherently
creating “a bias outside of the laws of this country,” constituted
good behavior.104 Roberts responded:
Well, I—for the reasons I stated yesterday, I don’t think it’s
a good approach. I wouldn’t accuse judges or Justices who

101
102
103
104

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 549–50.
Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 370.
Id. at 471–72.
Roberts Hearing, supra note 89, at 293.
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disagree with that, though, of violating their oath. I’d
accuse them of getting it wrong on that point, and I’d hope
to sit down with them and debate it and reason about it.
I think that Justices who reach a contrary result on those
questions are operating in good faith and trying, as I do on
the court I am on now, to live up to that oath that you read.
I wouldn’t want to suggest that they’re not doing that.
Again, I would think they’re not getting it right in that
particular case and with that particular approach and
would hope to be able to sit down and argue with it, as I
suspect they’d like to sit down and debate with me. But I
wouldn’t suggest they’re not operating in good faith . . . .105
Partially situated in a different, slightly less political sphere,
Roberts does not mirror Coburn’s interpretation of foreign law as a
violation of the Constitution or as a judge acting in bad faith.
Roberts’s approach is to characterize the citation of foreign law as a
misguided approach, and one worthy of conversation and debate.
The distinction between the Roberts and Coburn approaches
demonstrates that there is nothing inherently natural in the
negative labeling of foreign law citation practices as a pariah.
Roberts’s approach illustrates that a disagreement with the practice
of foreign citation could elicit an alternate social response that does
not attempt to ban or ostracize the practice. Additionally,
Roberts’s testimony also highlights that this process is not a simple
dialectic contest between political legislators, where we have
Democrats on one end of the spectrum who favor the use of
foreign law and Republicans who are vehemently against the
process on the other end. Roberts shows us the existence of one
additional dimension. Nominees like Roberts, along with nonpolitical actors, illustrated that multiple actors’ viewpoints are
constitutive of the process that makes judges and foreign law as
strangers.
Northwestern University law professor John McGinnis testified
that the anti-democratic nature of foreign legal citation threatened
to alienate citizens from the Constitution. He said:
My subject, the use of international and foreign law, is an
issue of substantial importance, not least because the
Supreme Court has come to rely on such material. For
105

Id.
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instance, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court recently
relied on the European Court of Human Rights as part of its
decision to strike down a statute of one of our states.
In my view, such reliance distorts the meaning of our
Constitution. It undermines domestic democracy and it
threatens to alienate Americans from a document that is
their common bond.106
In an exchange with nominee Sotomayor, Senator Cornyn
described the use of foreign law as an attempt to circumvent the
democratic process of constitutional amendment. He said:
I would just say if academics or legislators or anybody else
who has got creative juices flowing from the invocation of
foreign law, if they want to change the Constitution, my
contention is the most appropriate way to do that is for the
American people to do it through the amendment process
rather than for judges to do it by relying on foreign law.107
There are a number of reasons given why the citation of foreign
law may undermine democracy. Judge Alito stated that the
process subverts democratic self-government because “it is utterly
impractical, given the diversity of legal viewpoints worldwide.”108
In this instance, Judge Alito is referring to the lack of a systematic
method to survey and implement the wide variety of foreign laws
available to U.S. judges.
A second means that conservatives articulated as a reason why
the foreign legal citation process subverted democracy was
because the practice suffers from a democratic deficit and therefore
goes against democratic theory. During his hearing, Judge Roberts
argued that:
I would say as a general matter that a couple of things that
cause concern on my part about the use of foreign law as
precedent—as you say, this isn’t about interpreting treaties
or foreign contracts, but as precedent on the meaning of
American law. The first has to do with democratic theory.
Judicial decisions in this country—judges of course are not
accountable to the people, but we are appointed through a
106
107
108

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 547.
Id. at 465.
Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 370.
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process that allows for participation of the electorate, the
President who nominates judges is obviously accountable
to the people. The Senators who confirm judges are
accountable to the people. In that way the role of the judge
is consistent with the democratic theory. If we’re relying on
a decision from a German judge about what our
Constitution means, no President accountable to the people
appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to the
people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role in
shaping a law that binds the people in this country. I think
that’s a concern that has to be addressed.109
McGinnis further highlights the particular democratic deficits
found in international law, noting that not only are the laws
promulgated by unelected American officials, but that they are
formed by totalitarian regimes and law professors. He states:
But raw international law also lacks any democratic
pedigree and can cast doubt on our democratically made
law. Indeed, international law has multiple democratic
defects.
Totalitarian nations have participated in its
fabrication.
Very unrepresentative groups, like law
professors, still shape its form.
It’s also hardly transparent.
American citizens have
enough trouble trying to figure out what goes on in
hearings like this one, let alone in diplomatic meetings in
Geneva.110
Both Senator Coburn and Northwestern University law
professor Stephen Presser discuss the perils of using law formed
by institutions outside of the United States. Coburn discusses the
democratic deficit stating:
We don’t want judges to have closed minds, just as much as
we don’t want judges to consider legislation and foreign
law that is developed through bodies, elected bodies
outside of this country to influence either rightly so or
wrongly so, against what the elected representatives and
Constitution of this country says.111
109
110
111

Roberts Hearing, supra note 89, at 200–01.
Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 547.
Id. at 349.
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Presser argues that while the use of foreign law might lead to
“wise” results, a problem of the democratic deficit remains:
To put it in the vernacular—and we talked about this—it’s
the job of justices to judge, not to make law. In the past few
years we’ve seen several instances of justices turning to
international or foreign law to make American
constitutional law. Thus, Justice Kennedy, turning to the
law of the European community, found support for his
view, departing clearly from prior precedent, that
consensual homosexual acts could not be criminally
punished.
In a similar manner, recent Supreme Court decisions,
relying in part on European and other international
authority, have decided that it is unconstitutional to apply
the death penalty to minors and that it is unconstitutional
to apply the death penalty to persons suffering from mental
retardation.
Now, the results in all of these cases might be wise social
policy, but they all represent really legislative acts by the
court. In America, where the people are supposed to be
sovereign, changes in such social policies are supposed to
be for the popular organ, the legislature, or for the ultimate
popular organ in action, amending the Constitution.112
Presser links the democratic deficit issue to a larger problem
where the citizens of the United States face a great danger via the
loss of sovereignty to foreign nations. The next Section explores
how conservatives have employed the language of sovereignty in
discussions of foreign law.
4.4.3. Sovereignty
There was an incredible amount of testimony during the senate
confirmation hearings that the citation of foreign and international
law diluted U.S. sovereignty and subjected U.S. citizens to foreign
authority.
These concerns surrounding sovereignty and
governance were expressed most vehemently during the
confirmation of Obama nominees Sotomayor and Kagan.

112

Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 343.
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During the confirmation hearings for Kagan, Presser argued
that while there is a historical precedent for the use of foreign law,
the use of recent precedents diminishes sovereignty. He stated:
In the early years of our Republic and subsequently, judges
and justices have quite properly sought to understand and
apply the Law of Nations, a body of super-constitutional
principles that apply to every nation and that have been the
subject of work by international scholars for hundreds of
years.
But this recourse to the ancient Law of Nations, this
traditional recourse to international law, is very different
from turning to recent international or foreign
jurisprudence to implement policies and rules, very
different from those previously prevailing. One is a
longstanding legitimate use of international authority, the
other is a usurpation of the sovereignty of the people.113
Presser focuses on a particular type of popular sovereignty.
Senator Sessions also links the citation of foreign law to disrupting
popular sovereignty when discussing the governance of the
American people:
Foreign law, that’s a ranging [sic] debate within our
country today.
I do not see how anyone can justify a citation to actions
outside the country as any authority whatsoever to define
what Americans have done. Americans believe that you
only govern with the consent of the governed and we have
not consented to be governed by Europe or any other
advanced nation.114
Nicholas Rosenkranz describes how through the citation of
foreign law, foreign governments can control American law. He
testified:
When the Supreme Court declares that the Constitution
evolves—and it declares further that foreign law may affect
its evolution—it is declaring nothing less than the power of

113
114

Id. at 343.
Id. at 302.
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foreign governments to change the meaning of the United
States Constitution.
And even if the court purports to seek a foreign
‘‘consensus,’’ a single foreign country might tip the scales.
Indeed, foreign governments might even attempt this
deliberately. France, for example, has declared that one of
its priorities is the abolition of capital punishment in the
United States. Yet surely the American people would rebel
at the thought of the French Parliament deciding whether
to abolish the death penalty—not just in France, but also
thereby, in America.
After all, foreign control over American law was a primary
grievance of the Declaration of Independence. It, too, may
be found at the National Archives, and its most resonant
protest was that King George III had ‘‘subject[ed] us to a
jurisdiction foreign to our constitution.’’
This is exactly what is at stake here—foreign government
control over the meaning of our Constitution. Any such
control, even at the margin, is inconsistent with our basic
founding principles of democracy and self-governance.115
Rosenkranz constructs an ominous scenario where foreign
governments intentionally try to influence the laws of the United
States. He also analogizes, and therefore connects, contemporary
citations to foreign law to a history of U.S. resistance to foreign
control that dates back to the U.S. Declaration of Independence
from England.
Rosenkranz’s link between the guiding nature of contemporary
foreign law and the overt control of foreign governments prior to
the American Revolution is further articulated in an exchange
between Presser and Sessions during the expert testimony phase of
Kagan’s confirmation hearing:
[Senator SESSIONS.] Professor Presser, I think that this
international law issue is important because Americans
believe they should not be controlled by anyone that they
don’t elect to represent them, or getting taxation without
representation. How can we have our law controlled,

115

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 550.
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defined, or modified, or influenced by some parliament in
Belgium or some potentate somewhere in the world?
Mr. PRESSER. You’re absolutely right. We fought a revolution
over that and I don’t think we can let ourselves be guided by
some foreign bodies or some foreign emerging law. I only wish
you had had a little bit clearer answers perhaps from General
Kagan on that point. I think it’s one that you have to be very
concerned about.116
4.5. Learning
A debate exists surrounding the citation of foreign and
international law and whether this can serve as a site for learning
and as a source for “good ideas.”117 This issue surrounding
learning serves as a battlefront where those in favor of the use of
foreign law have chosen to fight. While opponents to the use of
foreign law point out that foreign law is not a useful source for
learning due to its dangerous and biased aspects, proponents
combat this narrative, arguing that foreign law is not only safe, but
that it is no different from other nonbinding, noncontroversial
sources of knowledge that benefit the legal decision-making
process.
Opponents argue in hearings that foreign laws do not offer any
benefits in the interpretation of U.S. law. The following exchange
between Senator Sessions and nominee Alito illustrates this point:
Senator SESSIONS. As you analyze how to interpret the
Constitution of the United States or a statute passed by the
U.S. Congress, do you believe that authoritative insight can
be obtained by reading the opinions of the European
Union?
Judge ALITO. I don’t. I don’t think that it’s very helpful—
in fact, I don’t think it is helpful to look at the decisions of
foreign courts for the interpretation of our Constitution. I
think we can do very well with our own Constitution and
our own judicial precedents and our own traditions. And I
Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 352.
Judge Sotomayor stated that in some instances foreign and international
law may serve as a source for good ideas. See Video: Speech to the A.C.L.U. of
Puerto
Rico,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
10,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/video/2009/06/10/us/politics/1194840839480/speec
h-to-the-a-c-l-u-of-puerto-rico.html.
116
117
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don’t say that with disrespect to the other countries. But I
don’t think that there are insights to be provided on issues
of American constitutional law by examining the decisions
of foreign courts.
I think that it’s very interesting from a political science
perspective to see what they’ve done, and I’ve personally
been interested in this over the years. And I think it’s
flattering to us that so many other countries have followed
our judicial traditions. But on issues of interpretation of
our Constitution, I don’t think that that’s useful.118
Alito points to serious concerns and questions for the learning
paradigm to grapple with. He raises issues of selection bias
mentioned earlier, but he also brings up the question of
understanding these decisions. He adds:
I also don’t think that it’s—I think that it presents a host of
practical problems that have been pointed out. You have to
decide which countries you are going to survey, and then it
is often difficult to understand exactly what you are to
make of foreign court decisions. All countries don’t set up
their court systems the same way. Foreign courts may have
greater authority than the courts of the United States. They
may be given a policymaking role, and therefore, it would
be more appropriate for them to weigh in on policy issues.
When our Constitution was being debated, there was a
serious proposal to have members of the judiciary sit on a
council of revision, where they would have a policymaking
role before legislation was passed, and other countries can
set up their judiciary in that way. So you’d have to
understand the jurisdiction and the authority of the foreign
courts.
And then sometimes it’s misleading to look to just one
narrow provision of foreign law without considering the
larger body of law in which it’s located. That can be—if
you focus too narrowly on that, you may distort the big
picture, so for those reasons, I just don’t think that’s a
useful thing to do.119

118
119

Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 410.
Id. at 471.
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A lengthy exchange between Senator Cornyn and nominee
Sotomayor revealed the senator’s concern over issues of
sovereignty.
Senator CORNYN. I appreciate that. You testified earlier
today that you would not use foreign law in interpreting
the Constitution and statutes. I would like to contrast that
statement with an earlier statement that you made back in
April, and I quote, ‘‘International law and foreign law will
be very important in the discussion of how to think about
unsettled issues in our legal system. It is my hope that
judges everywhere will continue to do this.’’
Let me repeat the words that you used 3 months ago. You
said ‘‘very important’’ and you said ‘‘judges everywhere.’’
This suggests to me that you consider the use of foreign law
to be broader than you indicated in your testimony earlier
today.
Do you stand by the testimony you gave earlier today, do
you stand by the speech you gave 3 months ago, or can you
reconcile those for us?
Judge SOTOMAYOR. Stand by both, because the speech
made very clear, in any number of places, where I said you
can’t use it to interpret the Constitution or American law. I
went through—not a lengthy, because it was a shorter
speech, but I described the situations in which American
law looks to foreign law by its terms, meaning it’s
counseled by American law.
My part of the speech said people misunderstand what the
word ‘‘use’’ means and I noted that ‘‘use’’ appears to
people to mean if you cite a foreign decision, that means it’s
controlling an outcome or that you are using it to control an
outcome, and I said no.
You think about foreign law as a—and I believe my words
said this. You think about foreign law the way judges think
about all sources of information, ideas, and you think about
them as ideas both from law review articles and from state
court decisions and from all the sources, including
Wikipedia, that people think about ideas. Okay.
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They don’t control the outcome of the case. The law
compels that outcome and you have to follow the law. But
judges think. We engage in academic discussions. We talk
about ideas.
Sometimes you will see judges who choose—I haven’t, it’s
not my style, but there are judges who will drop a footnote
and talk about an idea. I’m not thinking that they’re using
that idea to compel a result. It’s an engagement of thought.
But the outcome—you could always find an exception, I
assume, if I looked hard enough, but in my review, judges
are applying American law.120
Sotomayor tries to alleviate these fears of sovereignty by
stating that it is American law, not foreign law, that is controlling,
and that foreign law serves solely as a learning tool for the judge.
In the following passage, Cornyn intimates that while foreign law
might not be controlling, that even in a persuasive way, it has some
impact on a judge’s decision-making process.
Senator CORNYN. Your Honor, why would a judge cite
foreign law unless it somehow had an impact on their
decision or their decision-making process?
Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t know why other judges do it.
As I explained, I haven’t. But I look at the structure of what
the judge has done and explains and go by what that judge
tells me. There are situations—that’s as far as I can go.121
Cornyn seems to create a very high bar in that any idea that has an
impact on a judge’s thinking can somehow have an effect on
sovereignty. Sotomayor reiterates the nonbinding nature of
foreign legal citations and again associates it with the process of
legal knowledge production (and perhaps legal innovation)122
when discussing foreign law with respect to “creative juices.”123

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 463–64.
Id. at 464.
122 For a discussion of foreign legal citation and legal innovation, see
generally Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Brown Abroad: An Empirical Analysis of Foreign
Judicial Citation and the Metaphor of Cosmopolitan Conversation, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 83 (2012).
123 Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 464.
120
121
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Senator CORNYN. You said, at another occasion, that you
find foreign law useful because it ‘‘gets the creative juices
flowing.’’ What does that mean?
Judge SOTOMAYOR. To me, I am a part academic. Please
don’t forget that I taught at two law schools. I do speak
more than I should and I think about ideas all the time.
And so for me, it’s fun to think about ideas.
You sit in a lunchroom among judges and you’ll often hear
them say, ‘‘Did you see what that law school professor
said’’ or ‘‘did you see what some other judge wrote and
what do you think about it,’’ but it’s just talking. It’s
sharing ideas.
What you’re doing in each case, and that’s what my speech
said, is you can’t use foreign law to determine the
American Constitution. It can’t be used either as a holding
or precedent.124
Sotomayor’s reference to foreign law as a source of good ideas
arose repeatedly during her and Kagan’s confirmation hearings. In
an exchange with Senator Coburn, nominee Sotomayor explained
her “good ideas” statement and her position on how foreign law
could serve as a source of knowledge. She testified that judges do
not use foreign law to come to a legal conclusion, but instead,
[w]hat judges do, and I cited Justice Ginsburg, is educate
themselves. They build up a story of knowledge about
legal thinking, about approaches that one might consider.
But that is just thinking. It’s an academic discussion when
you’re talking about thinking about ideas. Then it is how
most people think about the citation of foreign law in a
decision.
They assume that if there is a citation to foreign law, that is
driving the conclusion. In my experience when I have seen
other judges cite foreign law, they are not using it to drive
the conclusion, they are using just to point something out
about a comparison between American law or foreign law.

124

Id. at 464–65.
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But they are not using it in the sense of compelling a
result.125
Professor McGinnis, however, critiqued this educational
learning function of foreign law. He stated:
Foreign and international law may well contain good ideas,
as Justice Sotomayor suggested, but so many other sources
that have no weight and should not, I think, routinely be
cited as authority.
To put the question in perspective, undoubtedly, the Bible
and the Quran have many legal ideas that many people
think are good, but we would be rightly concerned if judges
used them as guidance for interpreting the Constitution or
even routinely cited them.
Depending on what text the judge cited and what she
omitted, we might think she was biased in favor of one
tradition at the expense of others.126
McGinnis chose an extremely limited religious perspective in
citing ‘problematic’ sources of good ideas. The democratic
nominees and democratic senators framed the debate in a slightly
different manner and compared foreign and international legal
sources to other well-accepted, non-binding sources of knowledge.
One popular source that proponents of foreign law referred to
repeatedly was the academic law review article. When Senator
Grassley asked nominee Kagan whether judges should ever use
foreign law for “good ideas,”127 she said:
Well, Senator Grassley, I guess I’m in favor of good ideas
coming from wherever you can get them, so in that sense I
think for a judge to read a Law Review article or to read a
book about legal issues or to read the decision of a State
court, even though there’s no binding effect of that State
court, or to read the decision of a foreign court, to the extent
that you learn about how different people might approach
and have thought about approaching legal issues. But I
don’t think that foreign law should have independent

125
126
127

Id. at 349.
Id. at 548.
Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 126.
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precedential weight in any but a very, very narrow set of
circumstances.
So I would draw a distinction between looking wherever
you can find them for good ideas, for just to expand your
knowledge of the way in which judges approach legal
issues, but—but making that very separate from using
foreign law as precedent or as independent weight.
Fundamentally, we have an American Constitution. Our
Constitution is our own.
It’s the text that we have been handed down from
generation to generation, it’s the precedents that have
developed over the course of the years. And except with
respect to a very limited number of issues, that Constitution
ought to—the fundamental sources of legal support and
legal argument for that Constitution ought to be
American.128
For Kagan, “good ideas” can come from a variety of sources,
and she implies that citation to foreign law is not much different
than citation to an academic law review article.129 Like Sotomayor,
Kagan explicitly confronts concerns regarding legal sovereignty
and iterates that the U.S. Constitution and American law is
fundamental and controlling. In a question and answer session
with Senatory Kyl, nominee Kagan highlights sensitivity to U.S.
sovereignty while clarifying the comparison between law reviews
and foreign law in the following quote:
Senator Kyl, I do believe that this is an American
Constitution. That one interprets it by looking at the
structure, our own history, and our own precedents. And
that foreign law does not have precedential weight.
Id. at 126–27.
Sotomayor made a similar comparison between foreign law and law
review articles in an exchange with Senator Schumer. She stated:
128
129

The question of use of foreign law then is different than considering the
idea that it may, on an academic level, provide. Judges—and I’m not
using my words. I’m using Justice Ginsberg’s words. You build up your
story of knowledge as a person, as a judge, as a human being with
everything you read. For judges, that includes law review articles and
there are some judges who have opined negatively about that. You use
decisions from other courts. You build up your story of knowledge.
Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 133.
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Now, in the same way that a judge can read a Law Review
article and say, well, that’s an interesting perspective or I
learned something from it, I think that so too a judge may
read a foreign judicial decision and say, well, that’s an
interesting perspective, I learned something from it.130
One member of the judiciary committee, Senator Schumer,
performed work in constructing the use of foreign law as benign.
Schumer made a comparison between the non-binding use of
foreign law and law review articles in a question to nominee
Kagan. He asked:
Senator SCHUMER. OK. And of course when an American
judge considers, they consider many non-binding sources
when they reach a determination.
I asked this of Judge Sotomayor because it came up then.
Judge Roberts’ prominent citation in a voting rights act case
decided last year, Justice Roberts, he cited an article by
NYU Professor Samuel Isacaroff published in the Columbia
Law Review.
Would you agree that Law Review articles are not binding
on American judges even though they might be cited by
some?
MS. KAGAN. Some law professors would like them to be
binding, but no. I agree, Senator Schumer, that the way
they are cited in these decisions are just, this isn’t binding,
this isn’t precedent, but this is a person who had a good
idea and the decision in some sense cites or reflects that.
Senator SCHUMER. And it sure wasn’t improper of the
Chief Justice to consider such sources in reaching his
decision, was it?
MS. KAGAN. Absolutely not.131
Senator Schumer continued to ask both nominees Sotomayor
and Kagan about other non-binding sources of knowledge that
judges used without controversy, specifically Justice Scalia’s use of
dictionaries in his decision-making process. In an exchange with
nominee Sotomayor, Senator Schumer asked:
130
131

Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 258.
Id. at 156.
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Senator SCHUMER. Right, and it is important. American
judges consider many non-binding sources when reaching
a determination. For instance, consider Justice Scalia’s well
known regard for dictionary definitions in determining the
meaning of words or phrases or statutes being interpreted
by a court.
In one case, MCI v. AT&T, that is a pretty famous case,
Justice Scalia cited not one, but five different dictionaries to
establish the meaning of the word ‘‘modify’’ in a statute.
Would you agree that dictionaries are not binding on
American judges?
Judge SOTOMAYOR. They are a tool to help you in some
situations to interpret what is meant by the words that
Congress or a legislature uses.
Senator SCHUMER. Right. So it was not improper for Justice
Scalia to consider dictionary definitions, but they are not
binding, same as citing of foreign law, as long as you do not
make it binding on the case.
Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. Well, foreign law, except in the
situation——
Senator SCHUMER. Of treaties.
Judge SOTOMAYOR. —which we spoke about and even then
is not binding. It’s American principles of construction that
are binding.132
Senator Schumer repeated this reference to Justice Scalia’s use
of five different dictionaries in an attempt to establish the meaning
of the word “modify” in a statute during the hearing for Solicitor
General Kagan.133 His goal was to argue “that American judges of
all ideological stripes keep their minds open to sources and ideas
other than those that are directly binding on them under the
constitution and the laws of the United States,” and that foreign
and international law was just one iteration of an idea source.134

Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 133.
Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 156. The particular case to which Senator
Schumer was referring was MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
134 Id. at 156.
132
133
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DISCUSSION

This qualitative study reveals that politicians—specifically
senators—are engaged in the production of strangeness and the
transformation of foreign law into a stranger. This Article has tried
to illustrate the process by which foreign and international laws
have become strangers in the United States—or how those who are
engaged in the process of using foreign laws are seen as strange, or
as engaged in strangeness/strange activity.
The data reveal a variety of cultural, functional, and structural
origins to strange laws. This project takes a conflict analysis
approach by examining how individuals contest the meaning and
use of foreign and international law during the senate confirmation
hearings. First, those who oppose the use of foreign law seek to
demonstrate that it is somehow structurally different than U.S.
domestic law. One might argue that one does not need to
demonstrate or construct this reality because U.S. domestic law
and foreign law, by definition of their origin, are structurally
different. However, simply because they are different doesn’t
mean that their difference has salience or any particular social
meaning. Opponents of foreign law construct these differences of
origin into having some meaning of outsider status or social
otherness. This occurs when Republican senators imply that
foreign law goes against the tradition of the U.S. Constitution and
is not allowed by U.S. law. The structural difference of foreign law
is further infused with meaning when it is linked to the biased and
counter-majoritarian desires believed to be present and
represented by the disadvantaged, minority-identity statuses of
Sonia Sotomayor and the homosexual male litigants in Lawrence.
Secondly, conservative opponents of foreign law go an extra step
and frame their conceptualization of the othered nature of foreign
law as biased and dangerous. They argue that foreign laws are
vehicles for judicial activism, threaten American sovereignty, and
are anti-democratic.
The data that this project presents illustrate an ongoing issue
contested in the senate judiciary confirmation hearings starting in
2005 with the nomination of John Roberts, continuing to 2010 with
the nomination of Elena Kagan. It is not clear whether a functional
theory is useful in explaining the existence of strangers, or if their
status is merely the result of a battle between political and legal
elites. Does society create strangers in order to fulfill particular
needed roles? Or are they the by-products of conflicts that result
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when different political and legal groups work to create a just,
functioning, society?
Society has three strategies for dealing with outsiders: (1)
absorption and assimilation, (2) expulsion or banishment, or (3)
entering into hybrid stranger relations.135 Both Karakayali and
Bauman present somewhat functionalist accounts for entering into
stranger relations. Karakayali offers a strict functionalist account
and illustrates the various ways that strangers are useful to
Bauman combines a functionalist theory with a
society.136
structural explanation.137 According to Bauman, in a postmodern
world, society has no desire to absorb the outsider, yet because of
structural limitations, is simply unable to erase and eradicate the
outsider.138 Therefore, society enters an on-going, never-ending
project where the stranger is perpetually constructed and serves
the function of signaling the boundaries of what is acceptable in
society.
Functionalist accounts of the postmodern stranger (even ones
with structural underpinnings) are problematic. First, it may be an
oversimplification to characterize the presence of the stranger as
the product of an ongoing, monolithic, society-wide management
process. Instead, it might be more accurate (and useful) to imagine
the stranger as the by-product of the contestation between
multiple, powerful societal insiders fighting to determine whether
a group or thing will hold insider or outsider status in society.
Secondly, Bauman fails to illuminate the mechanisms and social
processes that create the postmodern stranger, in part because he
engages in feckless futility arguments, which hold that postmodern
society is unable to eradicate the outsider (and therefore society
enters into an ongoing process of constructing the foreigner as a
stranger). This view relies on two great assumptions: (1) a group
(or thing) linked to identity in a postmodern society cannot be
erased or eradicated from society,139 and (2) the social construction
See supra Part 2.
See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text.
137 See Bauman, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
139 Bauman argues that the postmodern stranger cannot be expelled, erased,
eradicated or banished from society. Bauman, supra note 29, at 12. This type of
futility argument ignores the possibility of social change. The data from this
project revealed significant changes simply in the framing of foreign and
international law in the more than two decades that separated the O’Connor and
Roberts hearings. If one focuses specifically on the lack of formal/legal (i.e.,
135
136
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of the postmodern stranger is somehow linked to a large, group
social consciousness where society is either aware, has knowledge,
or can at least understand that the eradication of the outsider is
impossible.
The data from the senate judiciary committee hearings may
help generate a more complex understanding of the production of
strangers in a postmodern world. First, it is not clear from the data
that the senators are engaged in an ongoing management process
that consciously tries to transform foreign law into a dangerous
stranger. The hearings reveal a complex socio-legal political world
where judges, legislators, academics, and policy activists debate
the proper role of the citation and use of foreign and international
law.140 In this complex world, multiple members, not one
conservative arm of the nation-state, are responsible for producing
the foreign legal stranger. This contested process is constituted on
a number of different scales (i.e., state and national) in multiple
spheres (political, government, judicial, academic, non-profit
activist), and comprised of a variety of actors of disparate political
persuasions and ideologies. The debate surrounding the role of
foreign law is so complex that it does not merely exist on a
conservative/liberal political ideology scale. One must also
consider conservative/liberal ideology on a judicial scale. For
example, while liberal judges’ foreign citation practices are
criticized by their conservative judicial counterparts, conservative
judges take an approach different than conservative legislators and
do not call for the ban of citation to foreign legal authority, but
structural) bans of the use of foreign law, there are a significant number of state
legislatures that have passed legislation outlawing the judicial use of foreign and
international law. In addition, federal resolutions and legislations have also been
introduced. One might argue that these state legislative actions might not be
unconstitutional and unenforceable, and therefore hold mostly a symbolic value.
The same argument can be made for non-binding federal resolutions. This
argument that these actions are merely symbolic and therefore are not legitimate
attempts at manufacturing outsiders ignores the incremental nature of social
change and the power of symbolic victories. The passage of the non-binding
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 was symbolic, but also
aspirational. The UDHR was the precursor to more binding international treaties
in the 1960s, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
140 While the senate judiciary committee is comprised of eighteen members,
there are only a small minority of these members who have (or had) actively and
consistently debated the role of foreign law and the judiciary. They include senate
Republicans Brownback, Coburn, Cornyn, DeWine, Kyl and Sessions, and
Democrats Leahy and Schumer.
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instead believe that this is something that is to be worked out
amongst the courts.
There is no legal world that has decided to enter into an
ongoing management process with respect to foreign law. The role
of foreign law is contested. One might argue that conservative
senators appear to be engaged in ongoing management because
over the years, they have not formally banned foreign law. This,
however, would be an unreasonably high bar to measure whether
a group was trying to eradicate an outsider.
Whenever
conservative senators discussed foreign law during the hearings,
they always discussed why it should be banned, and why it had no
place in judicial decision-making.
This debate over the proper role of foreign law takes place in a
society with a particular legal structure where there is no explicit
Constitutional or federal ban on the judiciary’s use of foreign laws
as persuasive authority. Therefore, given this legal structure, how
do conservative senators go about eradicating foreign law?
Senators can attempt to eradicate foreign law by both de jure and de
facto means. Senators can attempt to change the de jure law and
pass legislation and/or resolutions that ban the use of foreign
law.141 Because of federal constitution separation of powers
concerns, there are likely to be challenges to these legislative bans,
as has occurred when state legislatures have passed their own bans
prohibiting the use of foreign and international law.
This Article focused on senators trying to change the practice of
foreign citation in a more de facto sense. This study showed how
senators operated well within the structural limits of the U.S.
Constitution and exercised their authority “to advise and consent”
with the President of the United States with respect to judicial
nominations. Under this authority, senators can refuse to approve
nominees who cite foreign law if a majority of the senate judiciary
committee members view the citation of foreign law as a
prohibited “outsider” practice. In addition, the framing of foreign
law as an outsider may have a chilling effect on nominees and
other judges and stifle their use and citation of foreign law.142 The
141 This has already happened at the state level, where a number of state
legislatures have passed legislation to ban foreign law. See sources cited supra
note 17.
142 The chilling effect is often used in the context of curbing behavior under
the threat of litigation. A standard definition of the chilling effect states: “In
constitutional law, the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate exercise of a
constitutional right, especially one protected by the First Amendment to the
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conservatives that this project highlights are not necessarily trying
to create Simmelian strangers who are located on the border of the
insider/outsider. Instead, they are trying to produce outsiders and
ban the use of foreign law.
The postmodern stranger is not necessarily a conscious
construction of ongoing management, but the visible manifestation
of conflict. This conflict placed foreign law at the insider/outsider
border where it now sits as a sign of the border. Foreign laws
become strangers not because the legal and political arena manages
them as strangers, but because of the combination of the
contestation over their insider/outsider status and the existing
structures that shape those contests and limit the roles of
conservative legislators.
Structurally, foreign laws are not
forbidden (i.e., there are no laws prohibiting judges from using
foreign authority). Yet a significant conservative segment of legal
and political elites have attempted to move foreign law to the
periphery. The by-product of this movement is that foreign law
sits at (or on) the border of insider/outsider status and now
occupies the status of stranger. In occupying this status, it also
fulfills a useful and beneficial function—it signals various limits of
boundaries of society (i.e., every senator can agree that it would
violate sovereignty and democracy if judges used foreign and
international law as binding authority). While this function does
not explain fully why the status of the stranger exists, it supports
the continued existence of the stranger status.
6.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The primary goal of this Article was to improve our theoretical
understanding of the social production of strangers. The major
finding is that strangers, at least in a postmodern sense, are
produced as a by-product when members of society contest the

United States Constitution, by the potential or threatened prosecution under, or
application of, a law or sanction.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD LAW DICTIONARY 70
(Susan Ellis Wild ed., 2006). I do not believe that court judges and justices, at least
on a federal level, fear litigation; however, the huge uproar in Congress and in the
popular media may have caused some justices to rethink how often, or whether
they plan to cite to foreign authority. I think that this is present in the ways in
which the nominees discussed the use of foreign law. However, I admit that what
may be chilling with respect to how a Supreme Court nominee expresses his or
her views on foreign law may not have the same chilling effect on that same
nominee once the appointment to the court is confirmed, and he or she has life
tenure.
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meaning of social boundaries. Social structure is a vital component
to this understanding because it not only helps shape the meaning
of boundaries, but it can also determine the actual position of
whether a subject is fixed inside, outside, or on the border. This
Article generates this theory by analyzing the social conflicts that
arise over the use of foreign law, where proponents justify the use
of foreign law as a useful, innocuous source of learning, and
opponents dismiss it as a biased, anti-American dangerous pariah.
Another goal of this Article was to begin a theorization of the
stranger that was broader and moved beyond relations merely
with people to include the cultural artifacts (e.g., laws) that people
produce. This work attempts to establish that these types of
relations can include such cultural and social products. Future
work should explore the social production of other artifacts as
dangerous strangers. One popular example could be the kerfuffle
started in the congressional cafeteria when French fries were
banned and renamed freedom fries.143 Are there other strange
socially and/or humanly manufactured items? If so, what is the
process that led to their status of strangeness?
Future work should also explore the relationship between the
social production of strange objects (i.e., law) and the production of
strangers (i.e., people). This project touched on how conservative
senators linked the otherness of disadvantaged minority identities
to foreign law. It is important, however, to discuss how the
transformation of foreign law into a danger stranger affects the
holders of disadvantaged minority status. Perhaps the creation of
strange law is another iteration of boundary making.
Conservatives who seek to regulate what some perceive as the
threatening identities of some minorities are able to avoid critiques
against claims of bigotry if they use foreign law as a proxy. This
strategy allows conservatives to battle foreign elite laws of Europe,
as opposed to the rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual men and
women. The end result, however, is that by attacking foreign laws,
conservatives are also attacking the progressive principles to which
they are attached. Future work can illuminate how the creation of
strange laws (or any other strange items) is used in the ordering of
society.

143 Sean Loughlin, House Cafeterias Change Names for ‘French’ Fries and ‘French’
Toast, CNN
(Mar. 12, 2003, 10:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/
ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/.
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